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ABSTRACT
This paper provides an analog to the aggregate monotonicity condition introduced
by Samuelson and Zhang [9] in a study of continuous dynamics. Our condition guarantees
that limit points of discrete selection dynamics are rationalizable strategies. We show that
the condition will be satisfied by the discrete replicator dynamic if the population does not
change rapidly. These results reconcile the Samuelson—Zhang theorem, which implies that
limit points of continuous replicator dynamics must be rationalizable, with an example of
Dekel and Scotchmer [2], which shows that limit points of the discrete replicator dynamic
may place positive probability on strictly dominated strategies.
We thank Tilman Bárgers, Vincent Crawford, Eddie Dekel—Tabak, and Larry
Samuelson for helpful comments. Sobel thanks the NSF for financial support.
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Introduction
This paper presents a condition on discrete game dynamics which guarantees that
limiting outcomes must survive iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. We are
motivated by two recent studies. Samuelson and Zhang [9] have given conditions under
which the limit points of continuous game dynamics must be rationalizable. To prove their
result, they introduce a monotonicity condition that is satisfied by the replicator dynamic
of evolutionary game theory. In contrast, Dekel and Scotchmer [2] have shown by example
that the discrete replicator dynamic need not eliminate a strategy that is strictly
dominated by a mixture of the other strategies. We wish to reconcile these results by
providing conditions under which discrete dynamics rule out dominated strategies and
relating those conditions to the discrete replicator dynamic.
We obtain the following results. First, we provide an analog to the
Samuelson—Zhang condition; our assumption guarantees that limit points of discrete
selection dynamics are rationalizable strategies. Second, we show that the condition will be
satisfied by the discrete replicator dynamics if the population does not change rapidly.
These results help to relate the Samuelson—Zhang theorem to the Dekel—Scotchmer
example.
Section 2 of the paper introduces the basic model. Section 3 examines the
Dekel—Scotchmer example. Section 4 discusses the monotonicity assumptions needed in
the continuous and discrete models and explains the relationship to each other and to the
replicator dynamic. Section 5 proves a result that gives conditions under which limit
points of discrete selection dynamics must be rationalizable.
Our framework and main result simply translate the Samuelson and Zhang result to
a discrete setting. 'We use their notation whenever possible.
Preliminaries
We deal with a finite two-player game.1 We let I be the set of n1 pure strategies
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of player 1; J denotes player 2's set of n 2 pure strategies. Player k's payoff function is
denoted by 7rk(i,j) for (i,j) E I x J. Let S n denote the standard (n-1)—dimensional
simplex. We extend 7-k( • ) to the space of mixed strategies Sni x Sn2 in the usual fashion
n i
 n2
by linearity. Hence, for (x,y) E Snl x Sn2' k (x ' y) E iEi E Irk (i ' Ij)x.y.. we will identifyJ'
the pure strategy i with the degenerate distribution that places probability one on the ith
pure strategy. In keeping with the usual framework for evolutionary game theory, it is
useful to imagine that there are infinite populations of players who take on the roles of
player one and two; that players from each population are randomly and anonymously
paired; and that all individuals play pure strategies so that an element of S ni represents
the fraction of members of the population that play each pure strategy.
Samuelson and Zhang consider continuous dynamics determined by functions (f,g),
where f: S x Sn2 —* Sni and g:	 x Sn2	 Sn2 and
(1)
	
xi = fi (x,y)
	
i = 1, ..., n / and	 Yi = gi(x,y) j = 1, ..., n2
that satisfy, for all	 (x,y) E Sn i x Sn2,
f(• ) and g(• ) are Lipschitz continuous,
ni n
iEif(x,y)	 O =	 gi(x,y),
for all x E Sni , if xi = O, then	 fi (x,y)	 O,
for all y E S n2 , if yi	O, then gi(x,y) > O, and
(CR)	 lim	 [f.(x,y)/x.] and limyi.40 [g.(x '"v)/y.] exist and are finite.
The first condition is the standard regularity condition needed to guarantee the
existence and uniqueness of solutions to the dynamic system (1) for any initial condition.
Conditions (C2)—(C4) guarantee that the path of solutions stay within the strategy
simplices. (CR) is a regularity condition which implies that growth rates fi (x,y)/xi and
g.(x,y)/y. can be extended continuously to the boundary of S nl x S n2 ; we shall denote
these extensions, given by the limits in (CR), by f i (0,y)/0 and gi(x,0)/0. This condition
prevents strategies that are present in the population from being eliminated in finite time.
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Samuelson and Zhang also impose another condition that is crucial for their result on
rationalizability.
	 We discuss this condition in the Section 4.
We will instead look at discrete dynamics defined by continuous functions (F,G),
1 x s2_,where F: Sn
	
n S	 and G: Sni x Sn2--> Sn2 and
(2)	 xi(t+1)	 Fi(x(t),y(t)) i	 1, ..., n1 and	 i(t+1) = Gi(x(t),y(t)) j 	 1, ..., n2.
(D1)	 If xi > O, then Fi(x,y) > O and if yi > O, then Gi(x,y) > O.
(DR)	 lim40 [Fi(x,y)/xi]
	 and limyi3O [Gi(x,y)/yi] exist and are positive and finite.
(DR) plays the same role as (CR).
We wish to know whether the set of limit points of a solution (x(t),y(t)) to (1) or
(2) place positive probability on dominated strategies. First we make precise our notion of
dominance.
Strategy x' E	 iS strictly dominated in M1 C Sn' relative to M2 C Sn2 if there
exists x E 5111 such that	 7r1(x,y) > ri(x',y) for ahl y E M2. Let 151(M1,M2) be the set
of mixed strategies in M1 	 that are not strictly dominated in M1 relative to M2. The
strategy x E Sni survives strict iterated admissibility (SIA) if there exist sequences of the
form Snl 
M10' M11' 
....
' M1T 
and Sn2 = M20' M21' "" M2T where Min+i =
13.1.(M1n'M2n) and M2+1 152(M1n)M211) for n = 1, ..., T-1, with MiT =
1
and M2— = I2`1\4( 111)M2T) and with x E MIT' Similar definitionsDl(M1T'M2T) 
apply for player two.
Pearce [8] shows that in two—player games the pure strategies that survive SIA
coincide with the set of pure strategies that are rationalizable (Bernheim [1] and Pearce [8])
in the set of all mixed strategies. We will say that a solution (x(t),y(t)) to (1) or (2)
avoids nonrationalizable strategies if ahl limit points survive SIA.
3. Discussion of the Dekel—Scotcluner Example
Dekel and Scotchmer [2] present an example in which for almost ah l initial
conditions, limit points of paths generated by the discrete replicator place positive
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probability on a strategy that is strictly dominated by a mixture of the other strategies.
Since the theorem of Samuelson and Zhang guarantees that this cannot occur for
continuous replicator dynamic, the example is puzzling. We briefly discuss the example in
this section.
The example is given in Figure 1. 2
 For both players an equal mixture of the first
three strategies dominates the fourth strategy. To discuss stability, we define the
replicator dynamic. The continuous replicator dynamic (f*,g*) takes the form
fi *(x,y) = Pri (i,y) — 7r 1 (x,y)]xi and gi*(x,y) = [71-2 (x,j)	 ir2(x,y)bri;
in the discrete replicator dynamic (F*,G*), F*(x,y) x + f*(x,y)pr i (x,y) and G*(x,y)
y	 g*(x,y)/72(x,y) so that, for example, x i (t+1) xi (t) = fi *(x,y)bri (x,y). Friedman
[3], Hofbauer and Sigmund [5], and Nachbar [7] discuss the replicator dynamic.
1,1 2.35,0 0,2.35 0.1,1.1
0,2.35 ....1„1 2.35,0 0.1,1.1
2.35,0 0,2.35 1,1 0.1,1.1
1.1,0.1 1.1,0.1 1.1 0.1 0,0
FIGURE 1
Dekel and Scotchmer show that for any dynamic path x(t) that satisfies the
cliscreie replicator dynamic with x(0) completely mixed, x4(t) converges to zero if and
only if x i (0) = x2 (0) = x3 (0). Hence, for almost all initial conditions, the dominated
strategy is not eliminated in the limit. 3 Their argument is subtle, but it hinges on two
observations. First, the discrete replicator dynamic restricted to the game determined by
the upper three—by—three submatrix of Figure 1 (the rock—scissors—paper game) must
approach the boundary of E 0 {x E S 4 : x4 = 0}. Second, if a dynamic path has a limit
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point on E0' then x4 does not converge to zero. The first observation follows standard
analyses of the rock—scissors—paper game (see, for example, Hofbauer and Sigmund [5, page
134] and Weissing [11]). The second observation follows (loosely) by noting that if a
dynamic path does approach the boundary of E0, then x4 will grow because, while it is
not a best response to the population strategy, it does better than the population average.
Samuelson and Zhang's result implies that ah l limit points of the continuous
replicator dynamic (that start from the interior of the strategy simplex) are contained in
E0 What accounts for the difference? Here we offer brief comments. The next two
'
sections of the paper provide a general treatment. First, continuous replicator dynamics
applied to the rock—scissors—paper game determined by the upper three—by—three
submatrix in Figure 1 do not approach the boundary.4 For this reason, after a finite
interval, the population does not return to states in which the fourth strategy is better
than average.
Second, we note that if a constant is added to each of the entries in Figure 1, then
continuous replicator dynamic does not change, but the discrete dynamic does change.
Indeed, if C > 20/7 is added to ahl of the entries in Figure 1, then (1/3,1/3,1/3) is a
globally asymptotically stable strategy of the rock—scissors—paper game under the discrete
replicator dynamic; both discrete and continuous replicator dynamics converge to
(1/3,1/3,1/3,0) in this case. Discrete replicator dynamics need not behave like continuous
replicator dynamics when payoffs (fitnesses) are low; they have qualitatively similar
properties if payoffs are sufficiently large.5
4. Monotonicity for Discrete and Continuous Dynamics
In this section we introduce the monotonicity condition needed for our result and
relate it to the Samuelson—Zhang monotonicity condition. We provide a sense in which the
conditions are equivalent when the time between periods in a discrete dynamic converges to
zero. We discuss the special case of the replicator dynamic. Finally, we point out that
5
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there is a correspondence between the conditions in the following sense: Any regular
continuous dynamic that satisfies the Samuelson—Zhang condition maps to a regular
discrete dynamic that satisfies our condition, and conversely.
Samuelson and Zhang introduce a condition, which they call aggregate
monotonicity, that combined with (C1) through (C4) and (CR) implies that continuous
selection dynamics avoid nonrationalizable strategies.6 The regular selection dynamic
(f,g) satisfies aggregate monotonicity if
n
(AM)	 ri(p,y) > 7r1(p',y) implies E	 (pi—pi')[fi(x,y)/xi] > O and
7r2(x,q) > 2(x,cr) implies	 (qi—gi')[gi(x,y)/yil > O.
Similarly, we say that the regular discrete selection dynamic (F,G) satisfies
aggregate log monotonicity if
n
(LM)	 /ri(p,y) > ri(p',y) implies E	 (pi—pi llog [Fi(x,y)/xi] > O and
n2
7r2(x,q) > 71" 2 ( x , q') implies	 (qi—giglog [Fi(x,y)/yi] > O.
(LM) is the assumption that we need in order to prove our main result. While it
does not appear to be a direct translation of (AM) to the discrete dynamic, (AM) and
n
(LM) serve identical purposes. Consider the function E(x,p) EE p.log x.. It is
straightforward to check that the first condition of (AM) holds ailroingla soluition to (1) if
and only if
dE(x,p)/dt > dE(x,p')/dt if 7r1(p,y) >
and the first condition of (LM) holds if and only if
E(x(t+1),p) — E(x(t),p) > E(x(t+1),p') 	 E(x(t),p') if ri(p,y) > 7r1(p',y).
Conditions (3) and (4) assert that on a solution path in both the continuous and
discrete dynamics, E(•) grows faster for better strategies.
In order to see how discrete dynamics change as the interval between adjustments
shrink, begin with a system of the form
6
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1(t)	 h(z).
Let
H(z;A) F.- z	 h(Z)á.
The difference equation z(t+A) = 11(z(t);A) corresponds to (5) since [z(t+z) — z(t)]/A
= h(z) for all A. From lim i5,0 H(z;A) z, it is straightforward to show, assuming
nl n l
i E (pi—p i i ) = O, that iE	 )[hi(z)/zi] > O if and only if there exists A o > O such
ni
that for all LS E (0,Z5 0 ), ¡E l (pi—pi ')log [Hi(z;A)/zi] > O. It follows that if a discrete
dynamic approximates a contínuous dynamic, then aggregate monotonicity for the
continuous dynamic is equivalent to aggregate log monotonicity of the discrete dynamic for
sufficiently small period length.
Since our primary objective is to reconcile results relating to the discrete and
continuous replicator dynamic, we will study that case in a bit more detail. It is
straightforward to verify that the continuous replicator dynamic satisfies (AM); the
Dekel—Scotchmer example, combined with Proposition 2 (which we state and prove in the
next section) demonstrates that the discrete replicator dynamic does not satisfy (LM).7
Now imagine that the period length shrinks. A natural interpretation is that if the
period length is A, then only the fraction A of the population reproduces in proportion to
its fitness; the remainder of the population lives on in its past composition. In this case,
the relationship between the population distribution of strategies at consecutive time
periods is
(7)	 xi (t+A)/xi (t) = (1—A) + Airi(i,y(t))/ri(x(t),y(t))•
Equation (7) is a special case of the transformations given by (6) that we used before (for
player one let h i (x,y) = Pr i (i,y)bri (x,y) — 1}xi ). As A approaches zero, the right—hand
side of (7) approaches one. Therefore there exists a positive A o such that if A E (0,A0)
then (LM) is equivalent to (AM). Further, the replicator dynamic always satisfies (AM),
so when the time between periods is short, the discrete replicator dynamic will also satisfy
7
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(LM).
For the replicator dynamic there is another way to see the relationship between
continuous and discrete dynamics.	 Add a large positive constant 	 C to ahl payoffs. Doing
so does not change f*(.), but it increases wi( • ) by C. It follows that the ratio
f*(x,y)bri(x,y) can be made arbitrarily close to zero with the addition of a large enough
constant. That is, one can find a constant C large enough so that if ah l payoffs exceed C,
then (LM) is equivalent to (AM); hence (AM) is satisfied for the replicator dynamics if ahl
payoffs are sufficiently large. Adding a constant to ah l of the payoffs has a natural
interpretation in the biological context. Here the payoffs represent fitnesses. If the
strategies chosen in the game make only a small contribution to relative fitness, then
different strategies will not grow rapidly in a time period. In this case the discrete
dynamic behaves like the continuous dynamic.8
There is a one—to—one relationship between discrete dynamics that satisfy aggregate
log monotonicity and continuous dynamics that satisfy aggregate monotonicity. Given any
continuous dynamic (f,g) define the log—a.ssociated discrete dynamic (F,G) by Fi(x,y)
w(x,y)x.efi(x'Y)/xi	 and G .(x,y) = ii(x,y)y.egi(x'Y)/Yi where 	 ) and p,(. ) are chosen
n
,y)/	 1-12
iso that E w	
e
(x,y)x. f (x xi	 , p(x,y)y.egi(x'57)/Yi = 1. It is clear that (f,g) satisfy
1	 l 3
(CR) if and only if the associated	 (F,G) satisfy (DR). Also, the following proposition is
an immediate consequence of the definitions.
Proposition I. The continuous dy.namic (f,g) satisfies aggregate monotonicity if and only
if the log—associated discrete dynamic (F,G) satisfies aggregate log monotonicity.
Let (r,g*) denote the contínuous replicator dynarnics. Theorem 3 in Samuelson
and Zhang shows that (f,g) is a regular, aggregate monotone continuous dynamic if and
only if fi(x,y) = A(x,y);*(x,y) and gi(x,y) = 0(x,y)gi*(x,y) for	 A(•) and fi(. )
8
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continuous and positive. g Combined with Proposition 1, we have a characterization of the
set of regular, aggregate log monotone discrete dynamics: They are simply the discrete
dynamics log—associated with multiples of continuous replicator dynamics. As we use this
characterization in the next section, it is useful to state it separately.
Corollary. The discrete dynamic (F,G) satisfies log aggregate monotonicity if and only if
there exist positive and continuous functions w(•), 4(• ), A( • ), and ,3(•) on S ni x Sn2
such that log [Fi(x,y)/xi]	 A(x,y)Pri (i,y) ri (x,y)] + log w(x,y) and log [Gi(x,y)/yi] =
a(x,y)[72(x,j)
	 ir2 (x ,y )] + log p,(x,y).
In the corollary	 w( • ) and ii(• ) are normalizations that guarantee that the dynamics
satisfy F: S ni x S n2	 Sni and G: Snl x S n2	 Sn2.
5. Aggregate Log Monotone Discrete Dynamics Avoid Dominated Strategies
Proposition 2 states that every lirnit point of a regular, aggregate log monotone
dynamic must be an optimal response to some mixed strategy of the other player.
Moreover, the mixed strategy can be taken to be a limit of averages of strategies played in
the past. In particular, if a pure strategy is strictly dominated, then it must receive zero
weight in the limit of any regular, aggregate log monotonic selection dynamic that starts
from an interior point.
The carrier of a mixed strategy u, denoted C(u), is the set of all pure strategies it
gives positive probability.
Proposition 2. Let (F,G) be a regular, aggregate log monotonic selection dynamic. If
(x(t),y(t)) is an evolutionary path with (x(0),y(0)) completely mixed and (x*,y*) is a
lirnit point of (x(t),y(t)), then there exist subsequences {s
n
} and {t
n
} of the positive
9
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sn-1	 tn-1
integers and ()7,5,-) such that 5-c- = hm 	 [tE0 x(t)]/sn, «Sr- = 	 [tE0 y(t)]/t, and
r1(i,37) 71-1(x,Y) for ahl x E Sni	 and	 i E C(x*) and
72(i,j) 7r2(5¿,y) for ahl y E Sn2	 and	 j E C(y*).
t n-1
	
t n -1
Proof.
	 We prove (8). Since x(t)/x(0)
	
II xi(t+1)/x4(t) =	 F;(x(t),y(t))/xi(t),
t = o
log [x(t)/x. (te)] — log [xi(0)/xi,(0)] =
tn-1
tE0 log {[Fi(x(t),y(t))/xi(t)1/[Fi,(x(t),y(t))/xi,(t)]}
By (LM) and the Corollary, there exists A( • ) such that the right—hand side of (10) is
t n-1
equal to t E A(x(t),y(t))[71(i,y(t)) 	 Hence (10) implies, for ah i and i',
tn-1
log [xi(te)/xi,(tn)] — log [xi(0)/xi,(0)] = tE0 A(x(t),y(t))[ri(i,y(t)) — 7r1(i',y(t))].
Further, because A(•) is continuous and positive on	 Sni x Sn2, there exists	 A(tn;i,i')
such that for all i, i', and n,
A(tn;i,i') mm n {A(x,y): (x,y) E Sni x Sn2} > 0 and
tn-1	 tn-1
to A(x(t),y(t))[71-1(i,y(t)) —	 ,y(t))] = A(tn;i,i'){to	 Pri(i,y(t)) — 71(i' ,y(t))1}.
It follows from (11) and (13) that
t n-1
log [xi(tn)/xi,(te)] — log [xi(0)/xi,(0)] = 	 [ri(i,y(t))	 ri(i',y(t))]}.
S -
Define 57-(s) E [ E y(t)]/s; using linearity of	 we can rewrite (14) as
t O
{log [xi(te)/xi,(te)] — log [xi(0)/xi,(0)]}/te 	 A(te;i,i')Pri(i,57(te)) — r1(i',37(te))].
By the definition of x*, it is possible to find a subsequence of t 	 1, 2, ..., which we
denote by {te}, such that x(t) > c for ahl i E C(x*). By compactness, it is possible to
select this subsequence so that {-Sr-(tn)}	 and	 {A(te;i,i')} converge as	 n approaches
infinity for ahl i and	 Denote these limits by 57 and A*(i,i'). 	 Taking limits in (15)
(using	 x1(t) E [0,1] and xi(0) > 0) it follows that if i E C(x*), then	 O < A*(i,i1[7-1(i,57) —
7ri(i',y)] with equality if i' E C(x*). Since	 A*(i,i') > O by (12), (8) holds. Similar logic
establishes (9).
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The proof of Proposition 2 uses techniques found in Schuster, Sigmund, Hofbauer,
and Wolff [10] who prove that time averages of periodic solutions to the replicator equation
are Nash equilibria. Note that the proof does not use the assumption that there are only
two players.
While (LM) provides a sufficient condition for a dynamic to avoid dominated
strategies, it is not a necessary condition. In particular, dynamics that only increase the
probability on strategies that respond optimally to the opponent's recent action need not
satisfy (AM) or (LM); dynamics in this class must avoid strictly dominated strategies,
however. Gul [4] and Milgrom and Roberts [6] show that limit points of adjustment
processes in this class must be rationalizable. Proposition 2 does show that dynamic paths
that satisfy (AM) are consistent with adaptive learning in the sense of Milgrom and
Roberts [6].
In view of Proposition 2, it is a simple matter to prove the discrete analog of
Samuelson and Zhang's Theorem 2.
Proposition 3. Let (F,G) be a regular, aggregate log monotonic selection dynamic. Let
x' E S ri ' fail strict iterated admissibility. If (x(t),y(t)) is an evolutionary path with
(x(0),y(0)) completely mixed, there exists a function f(t) with lim t,
 e(t) = 0 such
that for every t, there exists a pure strategy i(t) in the C(x') such that xi(t) < E(t). A
similar statement holds for a strategy of player 2 that fails strict iterated admissibility.
Proposition 3 differs from Samuelson and Zhang's Theorem 2 in only two respects:
It treats discrete rather than continuous dynamics; and it assumes (LM) rather than (AM).
Samuelson—Zhang's proof can be adapted to the discrete context with only small changes.
We choose to present a proof based on Proposition 2, rather than the direct proof of
Samuelson and Zhang in order to establish that limit points of the dynamic must be best
responses to time averages of past strategies.
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Proof.	 Let (x(t),y(t)) be an evolutionary path with (x(0),y(0)) completely mixed. Let
P be the set of limit points of {x(t)} 	 and Q be the set of limit points of {y(t)}. Define
sets A1 and A2 by
A1 = {u E ST11: u fails SIA and there exists x* E P such that C(u) c C(x*)} and
A2 = {Nr E S112: y fails STA and there exists y* E Q such that C(v) c C(y*)}.
It suffices to show that A/ U A2 is empty. VVe will assume instead that A1 U A2 is not
empty and argue to a contradiction. For a' E A1 U A2, let K(a') be such that
depending on whether a' E
a' E M1K(a')\M1K(a')-}-1 or a' E 1‘421Ca' M)\ -2K(a')+1'
Sni or Sn2. Let a be a minimizer of K(.) on A1 U A2' and let k = K(a). Without loss
of generality, assume a E Al. Since a E M lk \,M1k+1' there exists b E Mil( such that
ri(a,y) — 7r1(b,y) < O for ah l y E M2k
or, in words, b strictly dominates a relative to M2k. Let Y consist of ah l those
Sn2 such that yi > O only if j E M2k. It follows from (16) that
ri(a,y) — Iri(b,y) < O for ahl y E Y.
Since k is a minimum of K( • ),
(18)	 limt,o, yi(t) = O for
By Proposition 2 and the definition of a we know that there exists a subsequence {tn}
t n-1
such that a responds optimally to y, where	 [tE0 y(t)]/tn• From (18) it
follows that yi = O for j Ø M 	 so y E Y. Hence (17) implies that a cannot be an
optimal response to y; the contradiction completes the proof.
Y E
.11 m2k.
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We choose to work with two player games because that is the standard setting for
evolutionary dynamics and is the context for the Dekel—Scotchmer and
Samuelson—Zhang papers. Our results generalize in a straightforward manner to
n—player games.
2
	
Notice that the game is symmetric. Dekel and Scotchmer analyze the game as if
there is only one population of players, and analyze symmetric dynamics. While
Samuelson—Zhang and we explicitly allow asymmetric dynamics, this difference
cannot account for the different results: Strategies evolving according to
asymmetric replicator dynamics of a symmetric game starting from a symmetric
initial condition are identical to symmetric replicator dynamics. This observation
follows because the path of the asymmetric replicator dynamic of a symmetric game
starting from a symmetric initial condition is symmetric for all time. We would
expect stochastic dynamics to differ depending on whether there where one or two
populations of players. This difference is not captured by the deterministic
replicator dynamic, but may be captured in part by the difference between the
static ESS stability conditions for symmetric and asymmetric contests.
3
	
Dekel and Scotchmer modify the replicator dynamic to allow inheritance of mixed
strategies. For this specific:ation they prove that limit points of the discrete
replicator dynamic cannot by dominated.
Continuous replicator dynamics in the rock—scissors—paper game approach the
boundary if (all other numbers held constant) the payoffs equal to 2.35 in Figure 1
are less than two (see Hofbauer and Sigmund [5, page 161]). In this case, however,
the fourth strategy is not dominated.
The fact that adding a positive constant to payoffs changes the qualitative behavior
of the discrete replicator dynamic is not troubling for biological applications;
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relative reproduction rates should not be invariant with respect to adding constants.
It is disturbing for economic applications if players are expected utility maximizers.
We see no reason, however, why adaptive behavior of economic agents must obey
invariance properties derived from the assurnption of full rationality. On the other
hand, as Eddie Dekel—Taba,k has pointed out to us, some of the stories that can be
used to motivate studying the replicator dynamic in economic contexts suggest that
dynamics should be invariant with respect to ahl increasing monotonic
transformations. It is unlikely that strictly dominated strategies are assigned
probability zero in ahl limits of increasing monotonic transformations of the
continuous replicator dynamic.
Samuelson and Zhang introduce another, easier to satisfy, monotonicity condition,
the requirement that rri(i,y) > ri(k,y) implies that fi(x,y)/xi > fk(x,y)/xk and
show that this condition implie.s that regular selection dynamics avoids strategies
that are dominated by pure strategies. The condition and result carry over with no
changes to the discrete case. Friedman [3] and Nachbar [7] impose the same
condition.
Proposition 2 assumes (DR), which does not hold for the discrete replicator dynamic
in the Dekel—Scotchmer example of Figure 1. 	 Adding a small positive constant to
ahl of the payoffs in Figure 1 allows the discrete replicator dynamic to satisfy (DR)
for the game without destroying the qualitative properties of limiting behavior in
the example. Hence it is the failure of aggregate log monotonicity, not the failure of
regularity, that leads to the possibility that dominated strategies are limits of the
discrete replicator dynamic.
Hofbauer and Sigmund [5, pages 273-4] make the same observation.
Samuelson and Zhang's Theorem 3 only claims that if (f,g) is a regular, aggregate
monotone continuous dynamic then fi(x,y)	 A(x,y)fi*(x,y) and gi(x,y) =
16
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fi(x,y)gi*(x,y) for A(•) and /3(•) positive. Continuity of A(•) and fi(•) follow
from the continuity and regularity of (f,g) and (f*,g*). The converse implication
follows immediately from the definitions.
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